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JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTIBUS OATIS
Reid Hastie*
JURY TRIALS. By John Baldwin and Michael McConville. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979. Pp. vii, 150. $12.95.
Jury Trials is a flawed book that reveals many of the obstacles
confronting social scientists who attempt to resolve legal issues
through empirical research. The goal of the research reported by
Baldwin and McConville is "to evaluate the performance of the jury
in a series of criminal trials" (p. 21). More specifically, it is "to pit,
as it were, the verdict of the jury against the verdict of others involved in the case" (p. 21). Within this comparative framework,
three empirical questions were posed: (1) What are the evidentiary
or case circumstances in which other participants in the trial are
likely to express high rates of disagreement with jury verdicts? (2)
To what extent can questionable verdicts (verdicts questioned by
other trial participants) be explained with reference to the composition of the jury? (3) Are professional criminals more likely than
others to avoid conviction, and are they frequently acquitted in questionable jury verdicts?

I
The method Baldwin and Mcconville selected to answer their
questions was straightforward. Evaluations of jury verdicts in approximately 700 criminal trials (370 in Birmingham and 358 in
London) were obtained from trial judges, solicitors, defendants, and
police officers who were involved in the cases. The respondents were
not all equally eager to participate in the research, and response rates
and interview formats varied considerably across groups of respondents. For example, the London sample included only police officers, while in Birmingham a small percentage of defendants and
defense solicitors responded (barristers refused to participate at all);
police and defendant data were obt~ined in face-to-face interviews,
while solicitors and judges responded only on written questionnaires.
Because of constraints placed on the research by legal authorities,
Baldwin and McConville could not ask direct questions about the
* Associate Professor of Psychology, Northwestern University. B.A. 1968, Stanford University; Ph.D. 1973, Yale University. - Ed.
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respondents' evaluation of the verdict. Instead, the researchers distributed a written questionnaire that included a checklist of factors
that might explain the jury verdict, and asked the respondent to indicate which factor or factors explained the verdict in a particular trial.
For example, the possible explanatory factors for a guilty verdict included: strength of the prosecution case, weakness of the defense
case, absence of defense witnesses, failure of the defense to call witnesses, unreliability of defense witnesses, and bad impression created
by the defendant (p. 28). A final item asked the respondent to comment on the case. The report does not describe the face-to-face interview schedule, but it is clear that interview questions were more
direct. In addition to the basic verdict evaluation data, the researchers collected information about jury composition (each juror's age,
sex, occupation, race, and number of previous jury cases), case outcomes, case preparation, and preverdict predictions from some solicitors. However, the book provides detailed summaries of only the
verdict evaluation and jury composition data.
It is obvious that this method sharply limits conclusions from the
research. The most important limits are created by the biased sampling plan, varying response rates, and differences in the amount and
types of information obtained from the subgroups in the sample.
For example, we would expect that police views would dominate the
results, that the defense point of view would be underrepresented,
and so forth. In addition, the written questionnaire can provide
weak support, at best, for inferences about the quality of jury verdicts. The authors themselves were discomfited by the indirectness
of their questions; we might magnify their discomfort by noting that
laboratory research has shown that individuals' reports of their
causal inference processes appear to be of uncertain validity. 1 If it
seems that seif-reports are invalid, what are we to make of a solicitor, judge, or police officer's insights into a juror's reasoning
processes?
A further concern is raised by the authors' use of the questionnaire responses (mostly in the form of checkmarks) to classify jury
verdicts as questionable or dubious. The questionnaires were not
designed to identify improper verdicts and the authors do not describe the classification rules that they applied to infer them. Because of this omission, we never learn how the major distinction in
the analysis (the proper versus the improper verdict) was defined.
I. See, e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports On
Mental Processes, 84 PSYCH. Rev. 231, 242 (1977).
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The researchers' analysis began with the identification of "questionable" or "doubtful" verdicts followed by a search for factors to
explain these "miscarriages of justice." In the Birmingham sample,
"questionable acquittals" were marked whenever the trial judge and
at least one other respondent indicated that an acquittal was not justified (pp. 46-47). Forty-one of the acquittals (thirty-six percent)
were labeled questionable under this procedure. A verdict was classified as a "doubtful conviction" when at least two respondents (not
necessarily including the judge) doubted the jury's verdict. Fifteen
of the convictions (six percent) were so classified. The researchers do
not explain how they determined that a respondent believed the verdict was incorrect, and the answer is not obvious given the indirect
nature of the questioning. Interestingly, if the authors had applied
the same standards for convictions as for acquittals, a maximum of
eight convictions would have been classified doubtful (p. 71). The
method used to identify questionable acquittals (twenty-five percent,
thirty-nine verdicts) and doubtful convictions (six percent, ten verdicts) in the London sample, where police officers were the only respondents, is even more obscure.
The authors' major conclusion from the verdict disagreement results is that ''juries in both Birmingham and London were thought
by respondents to have reached wrong or questionable conclusions
on the evidence with a surprising frequency" (p. 127). The authors'
efforts to account for the appearance of "questionable acquittals"
were fruitless:
[We] could not, for example, explain the questionable outcomes in
terms of the social composition of the jury; we could see little evidence
of jury equity or of juries disliking particular laws; it did not seem that
professional criminals were often able to secure wrongful acquittals.
In short, almost no overall patterns were evident and no common factor or factors appeared to explain the questionable outcomes we encountered. [P. 131.]

As to doubtful convictions, the authors felt that their statistic indicating that "at least five percent of those convicted by jury were
said to have been convicted in doubtful circumstances" was the
"most disturbing finding to emerge from [the] research" (p. 128).
They concluded that two factors accounted for the occurrence of
"doubtful convictions":
[F]irst, that the jury appeared in many of these cases to be too easily
satisfied of the defendants' guilt because they failed to appreciate the
high standard of proof required in criminal cases; second, that the jury
apparently convicted the defendant through lack of comprehension of
the issues involved. [P. 76.]

March 1981]

Jury Trials

731

The support for this two-factor explanation is summarized as a series
of remarks made by the (nonjuror) respondents, and it is weak. It is
not clear how well the selection of remarks represents all respondents' views; many of the remarks cited do not strongly implicate the
authors' favored factors, and, at best, the remarks are speculations
generated by officials who were not involved in the jury's deliberations. For example, Baldwin and Mcconville quote a police officer's
remark that "I wouldn't have been surprised if they had acquitted
him. His story was more than plausible and he was very good in
evidence. Our case was quite weak and I was surprised at the verdict. I have been generally satisfied with the jury, but not on this
occasion" (p. 78). Three questions immediately come to mind: Does
this quotation accurately represent all this officer's reactions to this
verdict? Does it indicate that the officer felt that the jury "failed to
appreciate the high standard of proof required in criminal cases," or
might it mean that he believed some other factor explained the
"doubtful conviction?" How would a police officer have an accurate,
complete view of the trial evidence or of the jury's decision
processes? These same questions can be raised for all of the anecdotes cited in support of the two-factor explanation, and the authors
do not answer them.
The authors cite a third factor, racial prejudice, that might have
influenced jury deliberations. The defendant was black in seventeen
percent of the questionable acquittals (seven of the forty-one) and in
fifty-three percent of the doubtful convictions (eight of fifteen) (p.
81). A chi-squared test for independence of frequencies in a race
(black-nonblack) by verdict type (questionable acquittal-doubtful
conviction) contingency table yields a value of 8.36, significant at the
p<.0 I level. The authors did not calculate this statistic. They note
that, "Given the small number of cases involved, however, even this
pattern must be regarded as tentative in nature" (p. 131 ).
I have noted that the authors do not clearly specify the methods
used to identify questionable or doubtful verdicts, and they do not
use comparable standards for classifying acquittals and convictions
as in error. There are at least four other serious methodological
problems with using Baldwin and McConville's data to detect relationships between questionable or doubtful verdicts and possible explanatory factors. First, the search for explanatory factors focuses
only on the improper verdict cases. The analysis is not comparative;
features of the cases classified as questionable or improper are cited,
but we are given no statistical or impressionistic comparison to features of the proper-verdict cases. Thus, for example, one cannot re-
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late the statistics for improper conviction and acquittal rates of black
defendants to the central conceptual question (What causes improper verdicts?) because base-rate statistics on the fate of black defendants in proper verdict cases are not supplied: an interpretation
of the fifty-three percent doubtful conviction rate would vary considerably if the base-rate for proper convictions were ten, fifty, or ninety
percent. Second, the small sample size of fifty-six cases lowers the
internal power of analyses within the sample and the external power
for generalization to unsampled cases. A less obvious third problem
is that the search for explanatory factors is not systematic. For example, we do not know how many candidate-explanatory factors
were considered in the analyses of potential case-dependent factors
(chapters 4 & 5) or jury factors (chapter 6). Thus, when an apparent
correlation between race and type of verdict error (questionable acquittal, doubtful conviction) appears, we cannot estimate its significance because we do not know how much multiple testing has
inflated the chances of a spurious significant result. Finally, the authors could look only to five background variables Guror sex, age,
occupation, race, and number of previous impanelments) to analyze
the effects of jury composition on verdicts. They had no other background data, and no information concerning individual behavior
during deliberations. Given this meager information and the methodological problems described above, it is not surprising that the authors failed to find relations between verdict and jury composition.

II
Up to this point this Review has been a catalog of methodological weaknesses that reads like the table of contents for a research
methods text: biased sampling plan, unequal response rates, defective questionnaire design, obscure and uneven operational classification rules, impressionistic rather than quantitative analysis, focus on
the positive cell to answer a correlational question, failure to report
relevant base-rate data, inadequate sample size, unsytematic consideration of multiple predictive factors, and use of aggregated data to
answer questions about individual behavior. Although the authors
acknowledge many of these problems, they do not accept the strong
implications that their conclusions rest on impressions rather than
rigorous analysis, that many subtle and distorting biases are present
in their methods, and that their failure to discover clear empirical
relationships was predetermined by the research plan. Instead they
conclude:
The evidence that we have presented in this book has shaken our own
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confidence in the system of trial by jury. We believe that our own
inquiry has raised a sufficient number of important questions about the
precision of trial by jury to justify giving researchers access to the jury
room. . . . The onus to demonstrate why this should not be done
would now appear to lie with those who argue for its continued immunity from research. [P. 132.]

If the authors recognize that their research is riddled with many
methodological flaws, why do they present their conclusions with
such confidence? The answer to this question is the critical lesson to
be learned from Jury Trials. The answer is important because the
authors have presented strong conclusions with great significance for
legal policy. The methodologically unsophisticated reader may be
tempted to accept the authors' conclusion that the jury trial is a defective, error-prone decision mechanism because the authors speak
with the authority of social scientists. I want to make it clear that I
object not to this conclusion but to the spurious use of scientific authority to support the conclusion. The jury may or may not be an
effective dispute resolution mechanism, but the authors' research results are definitely not an empirical, scientific demonstration that
jury verdicts are error-prone. I think that such a misuse of research
results may be the greatest sin that can be committed by a social
scientist conducting problem-oriented research. Why does it happen?
Several factors underlie the authors' spurious sense of confidence
in the results of their research, and these same factors may inflate
confidence in the results of any research. First there is the simple
political and economic reality of the applied researcher. Social
scientists often make their living by planning and executing research
projects. To obtain and maintain funding they must express an air
of confidence in their plans, their methods, and their conclusions. It
is virtually fatal to display self-doubt, to abort a plan once funding is
started (regardless of the limits placed on their research instruments,
the lack of cooperation from participants, etc.), or to bury a final
report even when it is clear the method is intolerably weak. These
researchers have to report strong conclusions or they will be out of
work.
Second, pervasive and subtle biases affect the judgments of both
na'ive and sophisticated scientists. 2 Human judgments are dominated by recent, salient, frequent, memorable, and emotionally
2. See generally R. HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE 155 (1980); R. NISBETT & L. Ross,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS ON SOCIAL JUDGMENT 249 (1980).
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arousing sources of information. 3 Overconfidence in one's judgment
is an almost irresistible consequence of decision making without
feedback. 4 Experience - even training in statistics and research
methods - does not eliminate judgmental biases resulting from
preconceptions, sampling error, and systematic measurement error. 5
The authors' overdependence on police officers' views, blindness to
the importance of base-rate data, and overinterpretation of verbal
comments are common examples of judgmental biases, biases that
elude conscious detection.
Third, the authors started the research program with an impossible question. To rephrase the logic of their investigation, they hoped
to identify cases in which the jury verdict was in error and then to
explain these errors with reference to characteristics of the jury. It is
not clear that any empirical research method could adequately meet
these goals, but the inadequacy of this method is underscored by the
fact that jurors were not even included among the respondents. Perhaps Baldwin and McConville's research could have provided insights into factors that affect the attitudes of the judge, the solicitor,
the defendant, and (most of all) the police officer toward a trial verdict. The authors might have proposed a theory to explain the sizeable discrepancies among these perspectives; their interview data
might have been relevant to such a theory. But, their belief that interviews with these trial participants provide valid evidence concerning jury behavior is simply unacceptable.
What are the implications of these factors for the design of future
research on jury behavior? The first strong implication is that
policymakers and others who fund projects such as Jury Trials
should become more sensitive to the realities of research. How to
educate policymakers is unclear, but the consequence of ignorance is
not: it will result in more research like that reported in Jury Trials.
The second implication is that researchers should be aware of
their own judgmental biases and attempt to correct for them when
drawing conclusions from data. This is a difficult task. It is decep3. Taylor & Fiske, Salience, allention, and attribution: Top of the /1ead phenomena, in 11
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 253 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1978): Tversky &
Kahneman, Availability: A heuristicfor judgingfrequency andprobability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH,
207, 230 (1973).

4. See, e.g. Einhorn & Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the Illusion
lidit;•, 85 PSYCH. REV. 395, 409 (1978).

of Pa•

5. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Set. 1124, I 130 (1974), and Tversky & Kahneman, Beliefin the Law ofSmall Numbers, 76
PSYCH. BULL. 105, 109 (1971).
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tively easy to acknowledge the existence of a general bias but perversely difficult to identify its effects in one's own thought processes.
Certainly it helps to be aware of the existence of general classes of
bias. In addition, the relentless application of statistical procedures
as well as the intuitive evaluation of conclusions is a strong safeguard.
A third implication is that the initial step in the research program
- statement of research questions - is of utmost importance. Two
fine essays illustrate this point. In his essay on the "Quest for the
Middle Range" 6 Harry Kalven, Jr. clearly and forcefully argued that
the social scientist should avoid research questions that concern
high-level premises about fundamental values and preferences because those issues are beyond the reach of empirical facts. Similarly,
he argued that certain premises are beneath empirical evaluation because they are trivially correct and require no additional confirmation. Instead, the researcher should frame research questions in the
middle range, where empirical results can sharpen controversy by
eliminating some disagreements, by revealing new conceptual relations, and by focusing debate on nonempirical issues. Baldwin and
McConville's research program that attempts to explain inaccurate
jury verdicts by studying nonjuror reactions to the verdicts surely
falls outside this middle range. It is probable that no adequate empirical criterion for verdict accuracy could be established; it is certain
that none was developed in Jury Trials. A second wise comment on
research questions comes from a recent essay by Phoebe Ellsworth. 7
Ellsworth argues that one must consider not only the form of the
question addressed by research, but also the appropriateness of the
research method employed to answer the question. Thus, perfectly
good questions and perfectly good methods may still result in useless
research programs when inappropriately matched. In the present example, I would guess that even an acceptably restated version of the
accuracy question could not be addressed by Baldwin and McConville's indirect interview method. Post-trial interviews with jurors or
a mock-trial would be more appropriate approaches.
Kalven's classic essay included another message of particular relevance to books like Jury Trials. Empirical researchers should not
expect to resolve legal policy questions solely or even directly with
6. See generally Kalven, The Quest far the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal
Policy, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
7. Ellsworth, From Abstract Ideas lo Concrete Instances: Some Guidelines far Choosing
Natural Research Se/lings, 32 AM. PSYCH. 304, 309 (1977).
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empirical facts. Legal policy disputes inevitably involve a multiplicity of "legal ends"; their resolution invariably requires a consensus
concerning preferences. Empirical truths will, only sometimes, be
relevant.

